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The Criminal Law Docket: A Term of Modest Changes
by Alan Raphael
The Supreme Court’s most significant decisions regarding criminal
procedure in the current term concerned double jeopardy, the bar
on racial discrimination in jury selection, the excessive fines clause
of the Eighth Amendment, and the right to counsel on appeal. Most
of this article discusses the first two of those decisions. The Court
decided only one case regarding the Fourth Amendment prohibition
on unreasonable searches and seizures, and none interpreting the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment restrictions on admission of confessions
against defendants.

which the Supreme Court has recognized as allowing successive
prosecutions by separate sovereigns, such as the federal and state
governments, even though the subsequent charge would be barred
if both were brought by the same government. Gamble entered a
plea to the federal charge, was convicted, and received a 46-month
sentence, to be served concurrently with the state sentence. The
total time served by Gamble was the amount he would have served
had he been convicted only in federal court.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the conviction in an unpublished ruling. It
reasoned: “The Supreme Court has determined that prosecution
In United States v. Gamble, 588 U.S. ___ (2019), the Court
in federal and state court for the same conduct does not violate the
reaffirmed the dual-sovereigns (or separate-sovereigns) exception
Double Jeopardy Clause because the state and federal governments
to the Double Jeopardy Clause. The double jeopardy doctrine
are separate sovereigns.” The appellate court’s ruling cited as
announced in the Fifth Amendment prohibits a second prosecution
authority Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), which first
of a defendant for the same offense. Under the dual-sovereigns
clearly announced the exception,
exception, double jeopardy does
Eleventh Circuit cases from 1979
not bar successive prosecutions
All the justices in Gamble focused on two issues:
and 2004, which applied Abbate,
by different governments, federal
and the most recent Supreme
1)
the
intent
of
the
framers
of
the
clause
and
early
or state. Neither a state nor the
Court case applying it, Puerto
19th century treatises and precedents and
federal government may prosecute
Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct.
2) the question of when it is appropriate for the
or punish a defendant a second
1863 (2016). In Sanchez Valle,
time for the same offense. A
Court to reverse existing precedents.
two concurring justices, Justices
prosecution in a federal court does
Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader
not bar the bringing of charges in
Ginsburg, urged the Supreme Court to reconsider whether there
a state court; similarly, a prosecution in a state court does not bar
should be a separate-sovereigns exception to the double jeopardy
the bringing of charges or imposition of punishment subsequently
rules.
in a federal court or in another state court.
Double Jeopardy

Terence Martin Gamble was convicted of felony second-degree
robbery in Mobile County, Alabama, in 2008 and two domestic
violence charges in 2013. Under both Alabama and federal law, it
is a crime for a convicted felon to possess a firearm. While driving
his vehicle in 2015, Gamble was lawfully stopped for a traffic
violation, and a lawful search turned up a weapon, marijuana, and
a digital scale. Charged under Alabama law with being a felon in
possession of a weapon, Ala. Code 12-25-32(15), Gamble pleaded
guilty, was convicted, and served one year in prison. While the state
prosecution was proceeding, the United States charged Gamble
with violating the federal law prohibiting a felon from possessing
a weapon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), based on the same weapon which
led to the state charges. Prior to seeking the federal indictment,
the federal prosecutor in Alabama obtained permission from the
Department of Justice to bring the charge as being consistent with
the Petite Policy, which allows federal prosecutions following state
prosecutions in specified circumstances.
Gamble moved to dismiss the federal charge as violating his Fifth
Amendment right against being twice placed in jeopardy for the
same crime. The district court denied his motion on the basis of
the separate-sovereigns exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause,
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in Gamble’s case
to decide whether to follow or overrule the separate-sovereigns
exception. By a 7–2 vote, the Court reaffirmed that the separatesovereigns rule is consistent with the text, history, and intent of
the Double Jeopardy Clause and thus found no reason to reverse
Gamble’s conviction. Justice Samuel Alito wrote the opinion for the
Court, and Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion.
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Neil Gorsuch dissented. All the
justices focused on two issues: 1) the intent of the framers of the
clause and early 19th century treatises and precedents and 2) the
question of when it is appropriate for the Court to reverse existing
precedents.
Gamble argued that two developments since Abbate, when the
Supreme Court last addressed the issue of the separate-sovereigns
exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause in 1949, eroded the Court’s
basis for the ruling. First, Abbate was decided in 1949, years before
the Double Jeopardy Clause was held to apply to the states by
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Second, in the last half
century, the scope of federal criminal law has increased greatly so
that instances of overlapping state and federal jurisdiction are much
more common, and thus possible instances of dual prosecutions for
the same offense are much greater than had formerly been true.
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As to the first, the Court stated that incorporation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause as applied to the states included all aspects of the
jurisprudence regarding the clause, including the dual-sovereigns
exception. As to the second, the Court acknowledged the increased
possibility of federal and state prosecutions for the same offense but
saw the development as harmful only if the dual-sovereigns doctrine
is legal error. Because the Court found no error in applying the dualsovereigns rule, the possibly greater frequency of dual prosecutions
does not provide any reason to abandon the doctrine.
The Court concluded that the historical evidence asserted by Gamble
was “feeble” and that the text of the Clause, historical evidence,
and 170 years of precedent justified retaining the rule allowing
successive prosecutions for the same offense by different sovereigns.

Court will overrule next.” In Knick, dissenting Justice Elena Kagan
quoted Breyer’s words in Hyatt a month earlier and observed: “Well,
that did not take long. Now one may wonder yet again.”
The Alito majority opinion in Gamble concluded that Gamble
had failed to show that the exception was inconsistent with the
original understanding of the Double Jeopardy Clause or that
there was a good reason to reject the principle of stare decisis, the
application of existing precedent. The Court recognized that stare
decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity
of the judicial process” (quoting from Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808 (1991)). Although recognizing that stare decisis is less
binding in constitutional adjudication when compared to statutory
interpretation because in the former Congress cannot overturn
decisions by ordinary legislation, the Court held that “even in
constitutional cases, a departure from precedent ‘demands special
justification.’”

In her Gamble dissent, Justice Ginsburg rejected the view that the
federal and state governments are separate sovereigns and would
have overruled the Court’s decisions regarding the dual-sovereigns
exception. In her view, incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause
as a protection against state governments meant that, like the
federal government, states could not prosecute a person twice for
In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas concluded
the same offense. She saw no reason “why each of two governments that his initial skepticism about the dual-sovereigns doctrine was
within the United States should be permitted to try a person once
not supported by the historical record. His concurrence expressed
for the same offense when neither could try him or her twice.”
a very different view of the role of stare decisis in constitutional
Further, Justice Ginsburg viewed
adjudication than that expressed
the expansion of federal criminal
by the Court in this case. He
What is probably more important than the fate of
law as increasing the likelihood
asserts that the Court should
Gamble’s conviction or the retention of the dualof dual prosecutions for the
decide constitutional issues
sovereigns rule are the justices’ differing views on
same offense, which would have
“through adherence to the
been rare when federal criminal
correct, original meaning of
the question of when the Court should follow
law’s scope was more limited.
the laws we are charged with
existing precedent and when the Court should be
She pointed out that Gamble’s
applying.” For any decision
willing to overturn well-established Court rulings.
case was not an unusual or
that was “demonstrably
extraordinary one but, instead, a
erroneous—one that is not a
run-of-the-mill felon-in-possession charge.
permissible interpretation of the text—the Court should correct
the error, regardless of whether other factors support overruling
What is probably more important than the fate of Gamble’s
the precedent.” Thus, the majority’s consideration of stability of
conviction or the retention of the dual-sovereigns rule are the
the law, preservation of reliance interests, or judicial humility,
justices’ differing views on the question of when the Court should
in Justice Thomas’s view, improperly interfere with the duty to
follow existing precedent and when the Court should be willing to
decide based on the original understanding of the constitutional
overturn well-established Court rulings. In the current term, the
provision. According to Justice Thomas, precedent may be relevant
Court reversed long-established decisions in two cases, Franchise
when it is not demonstrably erroneous, “when there is room for
Tax Board of Cal. v. Hyatt, 587 U.S. _____ (2019), and Knick v.
honest disagreement.” Applying those tests in this case led Justice
Township of Scott, 588 U.S. ____ (2019). The Supreme Court has
Thomas to concur with the Court’s decision, concluding that “I am
been closely divided on numerous constitutional issues in recent
not persuaded that our precedent is incorrect as an original matter,
years, and recent appointments to the Court have altered that
much less demonstrably erroneous.”
balance so the majority may now favor positions on numerous
issues previously articulated by dissenting opinions. The willingness Dissenting in Gamble, Justice Gorsuch asserted that “the
[constitutional] text, principles of federalism, and history”
of justices to overturn precedents may be crucial in determining
demonstrate that the dual-sovereigns doctrine should be abandoned.
constitutional law in numerous areas, such as abortion, affirmative
Justice Gorsuch noted that the Court has always taken care in
action, deference to administrative agencies, death penalty
applying stare decisis in constitutional decisions because judges
jurisprudence, racial and political gerrymandering, rights of gay
swear to protect and defend the Constitution. He pointed out that
people, determinations of what unenumerated rights are protected
“blind obedience to stare decisis should leave this Court still abiding
by the federal constitution, and the scope of the Commerce Clause.
grotesque errors like Dred Scott v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, and
In Hyatt, dissenting Justice Stephen Breyer wrote of the dangers of
Korematsu v. United States.” Unlike Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch
reversing legal course “only because five Members of a later Court”
asserted that whether to apply stare decisis requires consideration
decide that an earlier ruling was incorrect. He then concluded:
of various factors—“the quality of the decision’s reasoning, its
“Today’s decision can only cause one to wonder which cases the
consistency with related decisions, legal developments since the
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decision, and reliance on the decision.” He then applied each of
these factors and concluded they supported an overruling of the
separate-sovereigns exception.
Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection

in removing one person from the jury and reinstated the juror
to the panel. Both those trials resulted in convictions, but both
convictions were reversed because of numerous instances of
prosecutorial misconduct. Flowers’s subsequent trials were for all
four killings. At the third trial, the judge rejected a Batson claim of
racial discrimination. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court
reversed the conviction after finding Batson violations regarding
the challenges to two potential jurors. The Mississippi Supreme
Court indicated that the prosecutor’s actions demonstrated the most
egregious instance of a prima facie case of discrimination that it
had seen. The next two trials resulted in mistrials because the juries
could not reach unanimous verdicts.

In another case that received a great deal of popular attention
because of a much-publicized podcast, the Court in Flowers v.
Mississippi, 588 U.S. ___ (2019), reversed the convictions and death
sentence of Curtis Giovanni Flowers for four murders in 1996 at a
furniture company in Winona, Mississippi. The Court concluded
that the prosecutor had engaged in racial discrimination by the
use of peremptory challenges during jury selection in the trial. The
prosecutor in the case was white, the African-American defendant
The case before the Supreme Court involved the sixth trial. The
had faced six trials for murder. The Supreme Court’s reversal of
same prosecutor acted for Mississippi in all six trials. The venire
the conviction does not prevent the state from trying him again.
consisted of 26 people. There were 6 African-American venire
Although the opinion strongly reiterated that courts must vigorously
persons; the prosecutor challenged 5 and allowed 1 to serve on the
prevent racial discrimination in jury selection, the Flowers Court
jury. Flowers challenged each of the strikes; the trial court found
made clear that it was making no new law and that the facts of the
a prima facie showing of racial discrimination and ordered the
case were so unusual that the
prosecutor to present race-neutral
decision has little precedential
justifications for the peremptory
The Mississippi Supreme Court indicated that the
value.
challenges. The prosecutor did
Flowers prosecutor’s actions demonstrated the
so, and the trial court found
The Sixth Amendment guarantees
most egregious instance of a prima facie case of
that Flowers had failed to meet
criminal defendants the right
discrimination that it had seen.
his burden of showing that the
to a jury trial in criminal cases,
challenges were intentionally
applicable to state trials through
racially
discriminatory.
Flowers
was
convicted and sentenced to
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, Duncan v.
death.
The
Mississippi
Supreme
Court
affirmed the convictions,
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). To select a jury, a random venire
rejecting
the
Batson
claim.
After
remand
from the United States
of prospective jurors is summoned. The potential jurors fill out
Supreme
Court
for
reconsideration,
the
state
supreme court again
questionnaires, and both parties and/or the court ask further
affirmed
by
a
narrow
margin.
questions to determine their fitness to serve on the jury. Then
either party may challenge venire members for bias or other cause,
and attorneys may strike a set number of them by peremptory
challenges. A party usually does not have to disclose its reasons for
exercising peremptory challenges. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986), the Supreme Court ruled that equal protection is violated by
the exercise of peremptory challenges used intentionally for racially
discriminatory purposes. Although Batson involved the actions of
a prosecutor, subsequent decisions have extended its reach to all
trials, civil or criminal, and all parties, and have also barred use of
peremptory challenges for intentional gender discrimination.
To determine whether Batson has been violated, courts apply a
three-part test. A party arguing that peremptory challenges were
employed discriminatorily has the burden to prove a prima facie
case of discrimination. If that standard is met, the court orders the
party who used the challenges to provide nondiscriminatory reasons
for each peremptory. The burden then shifts back to the objecting
party to convince the court that purposeful discrimination has been
shown. If the trial court determines that even one prospective juror
was removed with discriminatory intent, then the defendant has
met his burden of persuasion under Batson. In reviewing a Batson
challenge, the appellate court must show deference to the trial
court’s reasoning and will reverse only if it finds that the decision
was clearly erroneous.
Initially, the prosecution tried Flowers for two of the murders
in separate trials. During jury selection in the second trial, the
judge found that the prosecutor had committed a Batson violation
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

In ruling for Flowers on this appeal, the Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, found that the totality of the
circumstances demonstrated that the trial court erred in denying
the Batson claim. The Court concluded that four facts led to this
conclusion. First, the state in the repeated trials used its peremptory
challenges to remove 41 of the 42 black prospective jurors it could
have struck. (Data is lacking regarding the fifth trial, so these
statistics include only the first four trials and the present, sixth,
trial.) Second, the prosecutor removed 5 of the 6 potential jurors in
the sixth trial. Third, in questioning potential jurors, the prosecutor
asked far more questions of the black jurors before striking them
compared to the white jurors who were not struck; the Court
saw this disparity in questioning as an apparent attempt to find
pretextual reasons to strike black prospective jurors. Fourth, the
state’s expressed reasons for striking one juror, Carolyn Wright,
were equally relevant to a white juror who was not challenged.
She was the only juror whose strike was found to be intentionally
discriminatory. The Supreme Court opinion stated clearly that it was
not deciding that any one of these four facts alone would require
reversal of the conviction. Rather, it concluded that “all the relevant
facts and circumstances taken together establish that the trial court
committed clear error in concluding that the State’s peremptory
strike of black prospective juror Carolyn Wright was not ‘motivated in
substantial part by discriminatory intent.’” The Court clearly stated
that “we break no new legal ground. We simply enforce and reinforce
Batson by applying it to the extraordinary facts of this case.”
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Obviously, this decision is important to Flowers, whose four murder
convictions and death sentence have been struck down. The state
is free to retry Flowers again. The Court did not bar the same
prosecutor from bringing the prosecution of Flowers or requiring
the trial to be held in another county, although either would, if the
next trial resulted in a conviction and a Batson claim were made,
weaken the argument that there is a pattern of discrimination by
the prosecutor in the numerous trials.

Four months after being sentenced, Garza sought post-conviction
relief in Idaho state court, alleging his attorney’s ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to file a notice of appeal despite
Garza’s repeated requests. The Idaho trial court denied relief, and
the Idaho Court of Appeals and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed
the decision. The Idaho Supreme Court held that Garza could not
show deficient performance by counsel and the resulting prejudice,
as required by Strickland. The Idaho court concluded that the
presumption of prejudice recognized in Flores-Ortega does not
apply when the defendant has agreed to an appeal waiver. In a 6–3
decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Flores-Ortega’s
presumption of prejudice for failing to file an appeal as sought by
the client applies regardless of whether the defendant has signed an
appeal waiver.

When the Supreme Court decided Batson, Justice Thurgood
Marshall concurred. He applauded the Court for announcing that
racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the
Equal Protection Clause and for reversing contrary precedent.
Nevertheless, Justice Marshall also indicated a belief that Batson
would not eliminate impermissible racial discrimination and argued
that the only remedy to do so was ending the practice of peremptory
The Garza Court explained that “no appeal waiver serves as an
challenges entirely. Some critics of Batson believe that Justice
absolute bar to appellate claims.” Some waiver clauses may leave
Marshall was correct in his doubts about the effectiveness of the
certain claims unwaived, and some claims cannot be waived. Thus,
remedy the Court provided. Because the second step in Batson,
an attorney’s refusal to follow the client’s direction to file an appeal
requiring the challenged party to offer a nondiscriminatory reason
is always prejudicial. According to the Court in Flores-Ortega, filing
for the challenge, is easily met, and because of the deference given
a notice of appeal is a “purely ministerial task.” Ultimately, the
by appellate courts to the determinations made by trial courts as to
decision to take an appeal is the defendant’s choice to make alone.
the third step in Batson, the procedures
Excessive Fines Clause
in fact often allow the continued use
Ultimately,
as
Garza
shows,
the
decision
of peremptory challenges for racial
In Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. ____
to take an appeal is the defendant’s
or gender discrimination despite the
(2019), the Court held that the Eighth
choice to make alone.
decision’s strong condemnation of the
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause
biased use of peremptory challenges.
is applicable to the states under the
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to
counsel and includes the right to “effective assistance of counsel.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the
Court held that ineffective assistance of counsel was determined by
applying a two-part test: first, a defendant must demonstrate that
counsel’s performance was deficient; and second, a defendant must
show that the deficient performance was prejudicial to his case. The
Strickland requirement applies to trials as well as appeals.
In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), the Court held that
prejudice would be presumed, and thus need not be demonstrated,
when an attorney’s deficient performance denied the defendant
an appeal he otherwise would have pursued. This year, in Garza
v. Idaho, 586 U.S. _____ (2019), the Supreme Court held that the
presumption of prejudice recognized in Flores-Ortega applies when
a defendant signs a waiver of appeal in the course of pleading guilty
but then insists on filing an appeal, which his attorney fails to do.
In 2015, Gilberto Garza Jr. entered into two plea agreements arising
from criminal charges brought by the state of Idaho. The agreements
each contained a clause stating that Garza waived his right to appeal.
Shortly after he was sentenced, Garza informed his trial counsel that
he wished to appeal. According to Garza, he repeatedly attempted to
notify counsel of his request, and the attorney later stated that he
was aware of Garza’s wish to appeal. Nevertheless, counsel did not
file a notice of appeal and informed Garza, after the time for filing an
appeal had passed, that his appeals would be “problematic” because
of the waiver clause contained in the plea agreements.
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Under the Eighth
Amendment, “excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The
Excessive Fines Clause, the Court reasoned, is a safeguard for
defendants against abuses of the government’s power to punish.
After pleading guilty in Indiana state court to dealing in a
controlled substance and conspiracy to commit theft, Tyson Timbs
was sentenced to one year of home detention and five years of
probation, including a requirement for Timbs to participate in
a substance abuse treatment program. Additionally, Timbs was
required to pay fees and costs totaling $1,203. The state then
brought a civil suit for forfeiture of Timbs’s Land Rover, charging
that the vehicle was used to transport heroin. The vehicle, which
Timbs had recently purchased for $42,000 using money from
insurance proceeds and not from drug sales, was seized at the
time of Timbs’s arrest.
Although the trial court found that the vehicle had been used to
transport heroin, it denied the forfeiture because the purchase
price of the vehicle was more than four times the maximum $10,000
monetary fine that could have been assessed against Timbs in his
criminal case. Because of this disproportionality, the trial court
determined that the forfeiture was unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The Court of Appeals
of Indiana affirmed the trial court’s determination, but the Indiana
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Excessive Fines Clause is
applicable only to federal action, but not to state action. The Indiana
Supreme Court did not decide the question of whether the forfeiture
in this case was excessive.

PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to decide whether
the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is applicable to the
states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In a 9–0 vote, the Court reversed the Indiana Supreme Court’s
decision and held that the Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg wrote for the Court, and Justices Clarence Thomas
and Neil Gorsuch wrote concurring opinions. The concurring
justices agreed as to the result, but would find the incorporation
under the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause
rather than under the Due Process Clause.

application of that right to conduct by the federal government
and conduct by the states. It acknowledged one exception to this
rule, in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), which held that
jury unanimity is required in federal, but not state, criminal
proceedings, but indicated that the exception reflected an unusual
judicial disagreement and it is unclear if the Court would continue
or overrule that exception if it were challenged.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the Indiana decision and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
Searches and Seizures

The Court’s opinion focused on the history of incorporating Bill
For the third time in recent years, the Court addressed warrantless
of Rights protections to the states, as well as the application of
searches for blood alcohol concentration (BAC) in the bodies of
the Excessive Fines Clause to state civil in rem forfeitures (the
allegedly impaired drivers, in Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 U.S. ___
forfeiture of property used in the commission of an offense).
(2019). The Fourth Amendment has two clauses, one setting the
Justice Ginsburg noted that the history of the Clause dated back
requirements for issuance of warrants by judges and one prohibiting
to the Magna Carta and that, at the time of the ratification of the
unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrants are not always
Fourteenth Amendment, 35 of the 37 states expressly prohibited
required, but there is a preference for having judicial authorization
excessive fines. The protections found in the Bill of Rights are
before a police officer carries out a search or seizure. In numerous
enforceable against state action under the Fourteenth Amendment,
circumstances, court decisions have approved exceptions to the
Justice Ginsburg explained, if the protection is “fundamental to
warrant procedure, finding good reason for dispensing with a
our scheme of ordered liberty”
warrant and declaring the
or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
searches to be reasonable.
The protections found in the Bill of Rights are
history and tradition.” McDonald v.
enforceable
against
state
action
under
the
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). The
In Schmerber v. California,
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Ginsburg explained 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court
Court found those tests met and
in Timbs, if the protection is “fundamental to
thus concluded that the Indiana
recognized that forcing people
Supreme Court erred in holding
our scheme of ordered liberty” or “deeply rooted
to have blood taken from their
that the Clause did not apply to the
body is a search, but upheld the
in this Nation’s history and tradition.”
state court’s forfeiture of Timbs’s
warrantless blood draw of an
vehicle.
apparently intoxicated driver involved in an automobile accident
as reasonable under the exigent, or emergency, circumstances
Indiana argued that the Excessive Fines Clause “does not apply to
exception to the warrant requirement. The presence of alcohol
its use of civil in rem forfeitures because…the Clause’s specific
in blood diminishes once the person stops drinking, so the Court
application to such forfeitures is neither fundamental nor deeply
concluded it is important to have the test done quickly in order to
rooted.” In responding to this argument, the Court reiterated its
obtain a proper reading to be used in evidence.
opinion in Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993), which held
that civil in rem forfeitures are fines that fall within the protection
In Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013), the Supreme Court
of the Excessive Fines Clause when they are at least partially
clarified that Schmerber did not hold that all nonconsensual blood
punitive. To succeed in its argument, the Court contended, the
tests were allowed in evidence without warrants but rather that the
state would have to convince the Court to overrule Austin, or to hold
further delays caused by police dealing with an automobile accident,
that the Excessive Fines Clause is not incorporated because its
combined with the natural decrease over time in BAC, created an
application to civil in rem forfeitures is neither “fundamental nor
exigent circumstance allowing the warrantless search.
deeply rooted.”
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___ (2016), applied the search
The Supreme Court refused to consider the question of whether the
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement to justify
Court should overrule Austin because the state did not make that
warrantless breath tests of persons arrested for drunk driving
argument in the Indiana Supreme Court. In the Indiana Supreme
but not warrantless blood tests, because the breath tests are less
Court, the state had argued that the forfeiture of Timbs’s SUV
intrusive, equally trustworthy, and readily able to be performed. This
was not excessive; that court in no way addressed the Clause’s
term, the Court addressed whether a warrantless blood test should
application to civil in rem forfeitures. Thus, the Court declined to
be allowed to be admitted in evidence when the person in custody
reconsider Austin or to decide whether civil in rem forfeitures are
was unconscious or otherwise physically unable to participate in the
fines for purposes of the Eighth Amendment when they are partially
breath test.
punitive.
Like all states, Wisconsin law provides that a driver, by obtaining
Indiana’s final argument posited that application of the Excessive
a license, has given implied consent to submit to a BAC test when
Fines Clause to the states cannot be incorporated even if it does
there is probable cause to believe that the person was driving while
apply to civil in rem forfeitures. The Court reasoned that, once a Bill impaired by alcohol. Although drivers can withdraw the consent
of Rights protection is incorporated, there is no difference between
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases
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and refuse the test, their license may then be revoked and their
test is not allowed simply because the person has been lawfully
refusal used against them in court to show that they were driving
arrested, but a breath test may be carried out without a warrant
over the legal alcohol limit. Gerald Mitchell was stopped lawfully
allowing it. The tests are allowed without a warrant if there is
while driving and arrested for driving while intoxicated. Police took
an exigent circumstance, an emergency, or a similar necessary
him to the station for the breath test, but he was too lethargic to
situation, including situations in which a police officer is dealing
perform the test and then became
with a vehicle accident and, almost
unconscious. He was taken to
always, a situation in which the
This term, the Court’s opinions regarding
the hospital, whose personnel
condition of the suspect precludes
criminal procedure were more modest in scope
performed a blood test on him while
carrying out the less intrusive
he was unconscious. His BAC was
breath test. The Court has not
than in recent terms, which applied the Fourth
substantially over the legal limit.
decided whether the existence of
Amendment to new technologies and limited
His conviction on the drunk driving
an implied consent law makes any
the scope of the exclusionary rule.
charges was affirmed by the state
BAC test reasonable or whether an
courts on two grounds: first, that
unconscious person has given a
the implied consent laws mean that Mitchell consented to the blood
voluntary consent if, at the time of the test, the person was unable
test, thus satisfying the Fourth Amendment, and second, that it is
to revoke the implied consent to the blood draw.
reasonable to perform a warrantless blood test on an unconscious
This term, the Court’s opinions regarding criminal procedure were
person because the less intrusive breath test is not available.
more modest in scope than in recent terms, which applied the
Most of the briefing and argument before the Supreme Court
Fourth Amendment to new technologies and limited the scope of
concerned whether implied consent laws indicated consent to taking the exclusionary rule. Gamble and Flowers received the most media
the BAC test, but the Court did not decide that question. Instead, it
attention, but neither made any change in existing legal doctrine.
concluded that Mitchell’s inability to undergo the breath test due
Timbs did change the law by holding that the Excessive Fines Clause
to his lethargy and unconsciousness, combined with the natural
applied to the states, but the decision is not surprising in light of the
diminution of alcohol in his blood over time, almost certainly
reasoning of McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S.742 (2010), applying the
created an exigent circumstance that justified performing the BAC
second amendment to the states. Similarly, Garza and Mitchell do
test without a judge first issuing a warrant for it. The exigency was
not represent surprising changes from recently decided cases.
established because the officer could reasonably believe that the
delay necessary to obtain a warrant threatened the destruction of
Alan Raphael is a member of the faculty of
the blood content evidence of driving while intoxicated. The Court
Loyola University Chicago School of Law and
recognized that in unusual cases the defendant could rebut the
teaches criminal procedure and constitutional
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